Greetings, Dr. Craig.
Recently, I was watching an episode of the Atheist Experience in which they offer a critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. They cite an article by James Still which can be found on the Internet Infidels website (they include some of their objections, in brief, on their "counter-apologetics" wiki called ironchariots). It goes as follows:
They identify two ideas of time: absolute time and relational time. Absolute time (or Newtonian time) they define as "the straight chain of causal events". Relational time (supported by Leibniz and Einstein), on the other hand, states that time doesn't actually happen unless there are "bodies in motion, unless there are things relating to other things...If there is nothing doing anything, there is no time". They also refer to this as space-time. (I hesitate to refer to these as the A and B theories of time, if I understand them correctly, because neither denies the reality of time. Rather, the former seems to affirm the "objectivity"--I use this word very loosely--of time, while the latter deems it as a subjective phenomena). Here is where their argument gets strange. They say that, in your premises, you seem to agree with the idea of relational time. However, when you argue that God is the cause of the universe, they accuse you of switching back to absolute time. This made me scratch my head, as I don't recall such a flip being made nor such a flip being necessary for the argument to work (I recall you specifically saying that the universe had a beginning even though there was no time at which it did not exist). I guess it boils down to what they see as an inconsistency between God's creation of the universe and the chain of causal events within the existing universe. Finally, they concluded that this argument special-pleads, "just like every other creationist argument".
A second objection is offered. They argue that, for this argument to work, one must have knowledge of the initial conditions of the universe. If one states that they do not need such knowledge, then they must do so on the basis that God exists outside of space-time. But how, they ask, can we know anything about how God operates on a natural or non-scriptural basis? How can such a being even interact with the universe? They assume that one cannot properly answer these without appealing to "God is magical", and they, again, deem this as special pleading.
Finally, and they do so very briefly, they accuse your positing of God as the cause of the universe as a violation of Occam's Razor. A natural explanation, they say, would be much more simple than requiring the existence of an infinitely complex, external entity. While you have argued that God is, ultimately, a very simple entity, could a natural explanation (and assuming that this even makes logical sense), if one is found, be simpler?
These objections seem quite strange to me, and the fact that they did an uncharacteristically sloppy job presenting them didn't help much (something about their presentation, possibly how quick they skimmed through the major points, made it appear that they didn't quite understand them either). I was wondering how you, an expert in the Kalam argument, would respond to these.
Thank you for your time.