It was an interesting read, and you came out much better, by their estimation, than did Rosenberg. But I was interested in their response to your argument that the cause of the universe must be personal:
We have to be especially wary of the fallacy of equivocation here. Craig uses 'immaterial' to mean 'outside the universe' (like God), but he also uses it to mean 'not spatially extended' (like ordinary human mental states). But my mind is in the universe; more specifically, it's in the United States. My present hunger, for example, isn't nowhere. (Nor everywhere!) It's at the particular place where I am. But this means that we don't know of any minds that are nonphysical in Craig's sense, and it isn't obvious that there could be such minds. Likewise, minds as we know them are all temporal; it's not clear that we have any coherent idea of a thought or sensation existing outside time itself.
I've been considering some similar objections myself, and find that this is where I get stuck in using the Kalam. Any help you can give would be appreciated.
Click HERE to read Dr. Craig's answer